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SOME ASPECTS OF COLLATION
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that the patrimony of a per-
son is divided into two parts: one reserved to forced heirs and the
other which may be gratuitously donated either inter vivos or mortis
causa.' The Code further provides that among forced heirs equality
of inheritance is presumed unless their ancestor expresses an unequi-
vocal intent to favor one or more of them with all or part of the
disposable portion.' Collation, or the return to the mass of an ances-
tor's succession which a forced heir makes of gratuities which were
not intended as advantages from the disposable portion,3 is the means
by which this presumed equality is enforced.'
Collation had its inception in Roman law5 and was a part of the
law of ancient France.' Most of the collation provisions of our Civil
Code were derived from the Code Napoleon.' Despite this long his-
tory, some aspects of our law of collation remain in an unsatisfactory
state. Among these are the collation of donations mortis causa, the
time for collation, prescription of the right to demand collation and
the obligation of children to collate debts owed by a predeceased
parent to a grandparent.
Collation of Donations Mortis Causa
Although the Civil Code requires the collation of both inter vivos
and mortis causa donations,' since the 1929 case of Jordan v. Filmorel
1. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1493-1501. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 196.5-1966 Term-Successions and Donations, 27 LA. L. REV. 442, 448 (1967).
2. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1229-33, 1501.
3. Id. arts. 1227, 1231.
4. See, e.g., Succession of Webre, 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965); Succession
of Gomez, 223 La. 859, 67 So. 2d 156 (1953); Jung v. Stewart, 190 La. 91, 181 So. 867
(1938); Champagne v. Champagne, 125 La. 408, 51 So. 440 (1910). "The fundamental
basis of the doctrine of collation is simply the presumption of law, that an ancestor
intends absolute equality among his descendents in the final distribution of his prop-
erty .... " CRoss, LouISIANA SUCCESSIONS 506 (Fenner ed. 1891).
5. 2 DOMAT'S CIviL, LAW, nos. 2944, 2945, at 244-45 (Strahan's transl., Cushing's
ed. 1853); LEAGUE, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 293-94 (3d ed. Pritchard 1961); MACKELDLY,
HANDBOOK OF ROMAN LAW § 751, at 564 (Dropsie's transl. and ed. from the 14th Ger-
man ed. 1883).
6. BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW § 483, at 675 (Howell transl.
1912).
7. Succession of Gomez, 223 La. 859, 67 So. 2d 156 (1953). See LA. CIV. CODE arts.
1227-88 (Comp. ed., 16 West L.S.A.-Civ. Code 1972).
8. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-1969 Term-
Successions and Donations, 30 LA. L. REV. 197, 212 (1969); Comment, 26 TuL. L. REV.
203 (1952). See also LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1228-33, 1238, 1239, 1501.
9. 167 La. 725, 120 So. 275 (1929).
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the jurisprudence has indicated that the obligation to collate does not
apply to legacies. Jordan arose when a decedent left a will in which
one of two forced heirs was named as universal legatee. When the
excluded heir sued to annul a donation by the decedent to a third
person, the universal legatee intervened and claimed the entire estate
under the will. The lower court annulled the donation and declared
the decedent's will to be valid, but reduced the intervenor's legacy
to one-half of the decedent's succession on the theory that since the
de cujus had not declared an intent to bestow an advantage on either
of her heirs, the universal legatee could take only half the succes-
sion-either as heir or as legatee.'0 On appeal to the Louisiana su-
preme court, the only issue was whether the universal legatee was,
entitled to one-half or three-fourths of the succession, the latter being
composed of the legitime of one-fourth plus the entire one-half dis-
posable portion in the event that collation was not required. Chief
Justice O'Niell, speaking for the majority, asserted that the right to
demand collation arises only from donations inter vivos and not from
legacies" since "it would be absurd to say that what is given by last
will and testament, by an ancestor to his offspring, is presumed to
be given in advance of what the legatee might one day expect from
his ancestor's succession. "' However, the basis of the court's award
of three-fourths of the succession to the universal legatee was appar-
ently the decedent's intent since the Chief Justice added:
there is no indication . . . that a testator who bequeathes more
of the disposable portion of his estate to one of his descendant
heirs than to another must state, any more plainly that his favor-
itism itself expresses, his intention that the legacy bequeathed to
the favored heir is intended as an advantage, or as an extra por-
tion-in order to avoid the obligation of collation, strictly so
called.' 3
10. In other words, the universal legatee could escape the obligation of collating
only by renouncing the succession, but in that case, she could still take only the one-
halt disposable portion. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1237.
11. But cf. Succession of Ledbetter, 147 La. 771, 780, 85 So. 908, 911 (1920) (Chief
Justice O'Niell said that a bequest to a forced heir could not be an extra portion
"because the testator did not declare that the bequest was intended to be over and
above the legitimate portion.")
12. Jordan v. Filmore, 167 La. 725, 732-33, 120 So. 275, 277 (1929). For the source
of this contention, see Civil Code article 1227 which defines collation as the "supposed
or real return to the mass of the succession which an heir makes of property which he
received in advance of his share or otherwise," and article 1229 which provides that
the obligation to collate is founded "on the presumption that what was given or be-
queathed to children by their ascendants was so disposed of in advance of what they
might one day expect from their succession." See also note 16 infra.
13. 167 La. 725, 735, 120 So. 275, 278 (1929).
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Thus, the assertion that donations mortis causa need never be col-
lated was clearly dicta; 4 nevertheless it has frequently been repeated
in subsequent cases." '
Several Civil Code articles indicate that a forced heir who claims
a share of his ancestor's succession must collate all donations inter
vivos and mortis causa which were not declared by the donor to be
an extra portion. " However, the declaration that the gift or legacy is
intended as an extra portion need not be made in sacramental terms
so long as it is indicated "in an unequivocal manner" that such was
14. Justice Thompson dissented on the ground that the majority was usurping a
function of the legislature. Also dissenting, but without written reasons, were Justices
Land and Brunot. Id. at 746, 120 So. at 282. Although these dissents have gone largely
unnoticed, in Succession of Levy, 172 La. 602, 134 So. 906 (1931), Justice Brunot
referred to his dissent in Jordan and opined that both donations inter vivos and mortis
causa should be collated.
15. See cases cited in notes 23-25 infra.
16. See note 8 supra. In Jordan, Chief Justice O'Niell made a contrary argument
on the basis of articles 1227, 1228 and 1229. With reference to articles 1227 and 1229,
he declared that "[ilt would be absurd to say that what is given by last will .. .is
presumed to be given in advance .... " Jordan v. Filmore, 167 La. 725, 732, 120 So.
275, 277 (1929). See also note 12 and the accompanying text supra. Recently, a writer
commenting on this opinion stated that he failed to see any absurdity, despite his
concession that collation may not be the proper term to use when dealing with legacies.
See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Successions
and Donations, 34 LA. L. REV. 219, 220 (1974). See also 10 AuvRY ET RAy, DRort civiL
FRANCAIS § 627 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1971).
Actually, reliance upon the principle of collation to justify the collation of legacies
seems unnecessary. Article 1227 states that collation is the "supposed or real return"
which an heir makes. Although the word "supposed" may refer especially to collation
by "taking less" under article 1253, it can also be construed as referring to the supposed
return of testamentary bequests which actually remain a part of the mass to be
divided. Furthermore, the phrase "which he received in advance of his share or other-
wise" seems to require collation not only of donations inter vivos which are received
"in advance," but also of donations mortis causa which are received "otherwise" than
in advance. Corroborating this conclusion is a statement by the supreme court that
"the word 'otherwise,' as used in Civ. Code, art. 1227 .. .must, as we take it, be
construed with reference to the provisions contained in other articles, such as article
1230, which provides that: ' . . . collation is always presumed, where it has not been
expressly forbidden.' In other words, it is intended (by the word 'otherwise' as used in
the article quoted) to include anything and everything that may have been received,
taken, or in any manner acquired by the heir from the parent himself, save where the
latter has indicated unequivocally that it was intended as an advantage." Sibley v.
Pierson, 125 La. 478, 512, 51 So. 502, 513 (1910). But see Succession of Higgins, 275
So. 2d 447, 450 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), where it was said that the phrase "or other-
wise" in article 1227 "was not intended to apply to legacies (but to methods by which
an advance may be accomplished during the life of the testator other than by donations
inter vivos) since there was no reluctance on the part of the redactors of the Code to
make specific use of the term 'legacy' in the succeeding articles in the collation sec-
tion." However, the latter contention has previously been refuted. "This difference
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the will of the donor.' 7 Although an unequivocal intent to bestow an
extra portion may be evident in some testamentary donations to
forced heirs, the non-collation of all donations mortis causa cannot
be justified on the same basis. Thus, if the de cujus bequeathes all
or a large portion of his property to a forced heir, it may be presumed
to be an extra portion.' The testator's intent is likewise apparent if
the legacy is specifically from the disposable portion. 9 In other cases,
the testator's intent is not so obvious,"' and there may be an express
hetween donations and legacies did not escape the redactors of the Code. Nevertheless,
after having made and noted it in articles 843 and 845 [Cf. La. C.C. Arts. 1228, 12371,
they did not deem it necessary to conform thereto when drafting the subsequent arti-
cles. Sacrificing exactness of terminology for brevity of language, they applied the word
collation indifferently to the prohibition imposed on the heir-legatee from claiming the
things bequeathed to him, as well as to the obligation imposed on the heir-donee to
return the things given to him." 10 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 627 (La. St.
L,. Inst. transl. 1971).
Article 1229 refers to dispositions made in advance of what the heirs might one
day expect from the succession; it does not speak of dispositions received in advance.
In addition, the article expressly requires heirs to collate what has been bequeathed.
Article 1228 requires that donations inter vivos to forced heirs be collated unless
they were made as an extra portion, and it strongly implies that the same rule is
applicable to legacies. Prior to its amendment in 1898, article 843 of the French Civil
Code read substantially the same as article 1228 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The effect
of the 1898 French amendment was to provide that French law did not presume an
obligation on the part of forced heirs to collate donations mortis causa. Since article
1228 of the Louisiana Civil Code was derived from article 843 of the French Civil Code,
Chief Justice O'Niell indicated in Jordan that the 1898 French amendment should
reflect the proper construction of its unamended Louisiana counterpart. However, the
purpose of the 1898 French amendment to article 843, as well as a contemporaneous
amendment to the French counterpart of Louisiana Civil Code article 1501 (French
Civil Code article 919), was to change French law so as to establish a legal presumption
that all legacies are intended as an extra portion unless the testator declared otherwise.
Because the Louisiana Civil Code provides that all legacies are presumed not to be an
extra port ion unless the testator declares otherwise, judicial assimilation of French law
into the law of Louisiana cannot be justified.
17. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1233.
18. This was the case in Jordan v. Filmore, 167 La. 725, 120 So. 275 (1929). See,
e.g., Succession of Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So. 2d 234 (1945); Succession of Levy, 172
La. 602, 134 So. 906 (1931); Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463, 80 So. 659 (1919); Succes-
sion of Ford, 130 La. 442, 58 So. 141 (1912).
Prior to the 1898 amendment to French Civil Code articles 843 and 919, the
jurisprudence of France was to the effect that an exemption from collation was neces-
sarily inferred in the case of universal legacies. Comment, 26 TUL. L. REV. 203, 215
(1952).
19. See Succession of Maltry, 161 La. 1032, 109 So. 827 (1926); Succession of
Schonekas, 155 La. 401, 99 So. 345 (1924).
20. This may occur where special legacies of rather insubstantial amounts are
involved. Thus, if a testament merely states that $100 is left to a forced heir, it may
be impossible to determine whether the legacy was intended as an extra portion. Cf.
Succession of Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So. 2d 234 (1945).
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indication that a legacy is not intended as an extra portion." In such
cases, there is no justification for exempting advantages from colla-
tion merely because they were received by donation mortis causa.
Although the non-collation of donations mortis causa appears to
be a settled jurisprudential rule since Jordan, the result in every case
in which this rule has been cited was determined by other considera-
tions.12 In Winbarg v. Winbarg, '2 the decedent's testament expressly
indicated that there should be no collation. The terms of the will
under attack in Succession of Meyer 2 were contradictory, possibly
indicating the testator's intent to dispense with collation. In any
event, that suit was based upon a claim for the reduction of an exces-
sive donation rather than for collation. What was said about the
collation of mortis causa donations in Doll v. Doll 25 was clearly
extraneous since the issue there was whether a judgment of possess-
sion barred a demand for collation. In Succession of Fertel,2 the
testatrix had bequeathed her entire estate, less $100 per month to her
son, to her two daughters. The daughters were not required to collate
their legacies, allegedly because of the prohibition against collating
donations mortis causa, yet the son was required to collate his legacy
because the court interpreted the intent of the testatrix to so require.
The testatrix in Roach v. Roach" bequeathed all her property to
certain of her eight surviving children; collation was not required
because of her intent to favor the named legatees.
The most recent discussion of the collation of donations mortis
causa occurred in Succession of Higgins."' There the de cujus had
willed her entire estate, "share and share alike," to James and Wil-
liam English, her only children. William had predeceased the testa-
trix, leaving seven children who claimed their father's share ab
intestado by representation. When the testamentary executor pro-
posed to distribute three-quarters of the succession to their uncle, the
21. See Winbarg v. Winbarg, 177 La. 1071, 150 So. 21 (1933); Succession of Hig-
gins, 275 So. 2d 447 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
22. See cases cited in notes 23-28 infra. See also L. OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND
DONATIONS § 33, at 107 (1973); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1968-1.969 Term- Successions and Donations, 30 LA. L. REv. 197, 212 (1969); Note,
23 Ttu.. L. REV. 279, 280 (1948).
23. 177 La. 1071, 150 So. 21 (1933).
24. 198 La. 53, 3 So. 2d 273 (1941).
25. 206 La. 550, 19 So. 2d 249 (1944).
26. 208 La. 614, 23 So. 2d 234 (1945).
27. 213 La. 746, 35 So. 2d 597 (1948).
28. 275 So. 2d 447 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). See The Work of the Louisiana




children filed an opposition. The trial court maintained the opposi-
tion and ordered the executor to distribute the succession equally
between James and the children of William. On appeal to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal, James claimed that he should be entitled
to receive three-quarters of the succession by virtue of a one-half
interest under his own legacy and an additional one-quarter interest
from the intestate part of the succession (being one-half of the half
share of his deceased brother's legacy). 9 The court decided that since
the succession was partially testate and partially intestate,' " it was
subject to the laws governing dispositions mortis causa and legal
successions. The court then found that by the terms of her testament,
the decedent had expressed no intention to favor either of her sons,
and it therefore concluded that James would either have to accept his
legacy and renounce the legal succession, or collate his legacy and
share as a forced heir in the legal succession.' In either event, the
court held that James could recover only one-half of his mother's
succession.:2 However, the author of the opinion then proceeded to
contradict the court's holding by stating that he personally felt that
the right to demand collation should not extend to legacies, even
though he acknowledged that statements to that effect in earlier cases
were dicta.
Although the holding in Higgins was correctly based upon the
testator's intent, the dicta concerning the collation of legacies evi-
dences a continuing problem in this area of the law. Henceforth,
questions relating to the collation of donations mortis causa should
be settled by application of the rules of the Civil Code which state
that forced-heir legatees cannot claim their legacies in addition to
their hereditary shares unless the legacies are unequivocally declared
to have been made as an advantage or extra portion.3 3 Otherwise, the
Civil Code provisions on collation, as well as the rule that the funda-
mental goal in the probate of testaments is the ascertainment and
29. This contention was based on Civil Code article 1709 which provides that
every legacy remaining undisposed of because the legatee has not been able to claim
it shall devolve upon the legitimate heirs. Cf. Succession of McCarron, 247 La. 419,
172 So. 2d 63 (1965). See generally, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1965-1966 Term- Successions and Donations, 26 LA. L. REv. 468, 472 (1966).
30. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1697.
31. This is required by Civil Code article 1237. See note 10 and the accompanying
text supra.
32. It should be noted that the holding in Higgins contradicted the dicta in Jordan
which indicated that donations mortis causa are not to be collated.
33. See note 8 supra.
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execution of the testator's true intent, 4 may be circumvented.'
The Proper Time for Collation
No legislation specifically indicates the proper time for a forced
heir to demand collation from a co-heir; :" consequently, rules govern-
ing this matter have evolved jurisprudentially. It is settled that a
demand for collation during the life of the de cujus is premature. :7
Ostensibly likewise settled is a rule barring the demand for collation
after a judgment of possession in favor of the forced heirs.'5 Whereas
the prohibition against a demand for collation prior to the death of
the de cujus seems correct, the notion that a judgment of possession
forecloses the right to demand collation appears questionable.
Those cases which indicate that a judgment of possession vitiates
the right to demand collation are based on the proposition that by
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1712. See, e.g., Succession of Eliot, 237 La. 457, 111 So. 2d
144 (1959); Succession of Fertel, 208 La. 614, 23 So. 2d 234 (1945); Succession of
Maltry, 161 La. 1032, 109 So. 827 (1926).
35. Although the results of post-Jordan cases have actually been predicated on the
testator's intent, a return to the candor of pre-Jordan cases is a necessity. See, e.g.,
Succession of Maltry, 161 La. 1032, 109 So. 827 (1926); Succession of Schonekas, 155
La. 401, 99 So. 345 (1924); Succession of Fath, 144 La. 463, 80 So. 659 (1919); Succes-
sion of Williams, 132 La. 865, 61 So. 852 (1913); Succession of Ford, 130 La. 442, 58
So. 141 (1912). But see Miller v. Miller, 105 La. 257, 29 So. 802 (1901).
36. Note, 25 LA. L. REv. 983, 987 n.25 (1965).
37. See, e.g., Taylor v. Brown, 223 La. 641, 66 So. 2d 578 (1953); Roach v. Roach,
213 La. 746, 35 So. 2d 597 (1948); Succession of Waterman, 183 La. 1006, 165 So. 182
(1935); Jackson v. Jackson, 175 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
38. See, e.g., Himel v. Connely, 221 La. 1073, 61 So. 2d 876 (1952); Succession of
McGeary, 220 La. 391, 56 So. 2d 727 (1951); Doll v. Doll, 206 La. 550, 19 So. 2d 249
(1944); Mitcham v. Mitcham, 186 La. 641, 173 So. 132 (1937); Prichard v. McCranie,
160 La. 605, 107 So. 461 (1926); Milano v. Milano, 243 So. 2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971); Succession of Delesdernier, 184 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Comment,
27 Tui.. L. REV. 232, 241 (1953). An exception to the general rule arises when the
judgment of possession is annulled. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 2001-06; Succession of
Trouard, 281 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Succession of Delesdernier, 184 So.
2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Note, 25 LA. L. REV. 983, 988 n.27 (1965); Note, 3 LA.
L. REV. 460 (1941). Recently, Judge Hood, speaking for the Third Circuit Court of
Appeal, gave this explanation: "We are aware of the established rule that if there are
nullities in the succession proceedings and the judgment therein is attacked and set
aside because of those nullities, the right to demand collation would not be precluded
by the former judgment. That rule, however, does not authorize the annulment of a
judgment of possession solely on the ground that some of the heirs later discovered
facts which indicated that they may demand collation. Our interpretation of the
above-stated rule is that if the judgment of possession is annuled on other grounds,
then the right to demand collation may be asserted, since the void judgment must be
regarded as never having had any effect." Succession of Trouard, 281 So. 2d 863, 866
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
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the judgment of possession co-heirs become co-owners, thereby extin-
guishing the succession, and with it, the right to demand collation. 9
While there is no doubt that collation can only be made to a succes-
sion, there appears to be no justification for the conclusion that a
judgment of possession changes the character of ownership and re-
sults in an extinguishment of the succession.
A judgment of possession merely constitutes judicial recognition
of rights which come into existence by operation of law40 at the mo-
ment of an ancestor's death. This conclusion is supported by several
articles of the Civil Code. For example, article 944 provides that the
heir succeeds to rights of the deceased from the moment of his death;
article 946 indicates that a succession is acquired by an heir from the
moment of the death of the deceased; and article 1292 states that
heirs become undivided "proprietors" upon the death of the person
from whom they inherit.4 Furthermore, the comments of the redac-
tors in the Projet of the Code of 1825 expressly indicate that the
Roman and Spanish law, by which the transmission of the succession
did not take effect until the acceptance by the heir, was rejected in
favor of a rule by which the heir's rights vest at the moment of
death.4"
A succession is not a fictitious entity subject to extinguishment
by the judgment of possession.43 Although such a theory may have
been valid under a provision of the Digest of 1808,44it is no longer
39. See, e.g., Succession of McGeary, 220 La. 391, 56 So. 2d 727 (1951); Doll v.
Doll, 206 La. 550, 19 So. 2d 249 (1944); Mitcham v. Mitcham, 186 La. 641, 173 So.
132 (1937); Prichard v. McCranie, 160 La. 605, 107 So. 461 (1926); Succession of
Delesdernier, 184 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966).
40. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3062; LAZARUS, CASES AND READING MATERIALS ON SUCCES-
SIONS AND DONATIONS 171 (1970). See also Johnston v. Burton, 202 La. 152, 11 So. 2d
513 (1942); Tulane Univ. v. Board of Assessors, 115 La. 1025, 40 So. 445 (1905); State
v. Brown, 32 La. Ann. 1020 (1880); Succession of Christensen, 248 So. 2d 45 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1971); Culpepper v. Slater, 131 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
41. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 940-43, 945, 947.
42. "By the Roman law and by the Spanish, the transmission of the succession
did not take effect until the acceptance of the heir; the acceptance had merely a
retroactive effect from the death of the deceased. The heir was also obliged to apply
to the judge to be put into possession, on which subject the Partidas contains a whole
title.
"We have thought it best to adopt the rule which vests the right of the heir from
the moment of death of the deceased; which is also in accordance with the other
dispositions of our Code, which dispense with the necessity of the heirs applying to the
judge for an order to be put into possession, and give him the right of transmitting to
his heirs, the succession acquired by him even if he dies before he has accepted it."
PROJET OF THE CIVIL CODE OF 125, 1 La. Legal Archives 115 (1937).
43. But cf. cases cited in note 38 supra.
44. La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, tit. I, art. 74.
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appropriate since that article was deleted by the redactors of the Civil
Code of 182511 in accord with their announced intention to abandon
the fictitious entity concept. Moreover, article 872 of the present Civil
Code states that, in addition to signifying the transmission of rights
and obligations of the deceased and the right of the heir to the posses-
sion thereof, "succession signifies also the estates [estate], rights
and charges which a person leaves after his death . . . ." It therefore
seems illogical to describe a succession as "extinguished" so long as
its effects continue to remain in existence.
The barring of collation by a judgment of possession can have
harsh practical effects. It is not unusual for forced heirs to hold a
succession in common for many years after the death of either of their
parents, especially if any of the heirs are unmarried and continue to
live in the family home. Formerly, heirs often possessed this property
without first having obtained a judgment of possession, but the pres-
ent inheritance tax law makes this practice ill-advised since it pro-
hibits such heirs from later renouncing their inheritance and subjects
them to personal liability for the tax. 6 The result is that heirs usually
obtain a judgment of possession soon after their ancestor's death 7 but
may not make a demand for collation at that time since the succes-
sion may not be immediately partitioned. Later, when the property
is partitioned, collation is unavailable because of the previous judg-
ment of possession, which may have been obtained solely for inheri-
tance tax purposes, and the principle of equality among forced heirs
is thereby frustrated.
The scheme of the Civil Code indicates that collation is an inci-
dent of the judicial partition of a succession." This view, advocated
by most French commentators,' is supported in several Louisiana
cases.5 Although collation claims have been advanced and adjudi-
45. See PROJET OF THE Civil, CODE OF 1825, 1 La. Legal Archives 123 (1939).
46. See LA. R.S. 47:2413 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 35 §1. It should
he noted that this statute does not prevent heirs from becoming owners of the ances-
tor's property at the moment of his death. Succession of Scardino, 215 La. 472, 40 So.
2d 923 (1949); Succession of Blumberg, 148 La. 1030, 88 So. 297 (1921); Peterson v.
Herndon, 221 So. 2d 615 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
47. See LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3461, comment (a).
48. Chapter 12-Of the Partition of Successiors - immediately follows the chap-
ter on collation and includes detailed provisions for effecting the rules of collation.
49. Comment, 27 Tul.. L. REV. 232, 245 (1953); Note, 3 LA. L. REV. 460 (1941);
s('(', e.g., 10 LAURENT, PRINCIP.ES DE DROIT FRANCAis n' 590, at 650 (2d ed. 1876); 9
BAITDRY-LACANTINERIE ET WArl,, TRAITO THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT Civil. n" 2944
(3d ed. 1905).
50. Succession of Webre, 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965) (dissenting opinions);
'lavlor v. Brown, 223 La. 641, 66 So. 2d 578 (1953); Succession of Schonekas, 155 La.
,01, 99 So. 345 (1924); Sibley v. Pierson, 102 La. 478, 51 So. 502 (1910) (on rehearing);
[Vol. 34
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cated independently of partition proceedings, '5 in only one instance 2
does a court appear to have been aware of the inconsistency of an
attempt to equalize the distribution of a succession which is to re-
main intact. It is no statutory coincidence that the same section of
the Civil Code which provides for the manner in which judicial parti-
tions are to be accomplished also regulates the procedure for colla-
tion.' If the partition is to be made among forced heirs, and collation
is necessary, the decree of partition is exhibited to the heir bound to
collate who then decides whether the collation is to be made in kind
or by taking less.5', The active mass of the succession, when formed
by the officer appointed to effect the partition, includes all the ob-
jects collated in kind, as well as a credit for the appraised value of
all property collated by taking less. 5 When the effects of the succes-
sion are divided among the heirs, allowances are made for collation
in order to equalize the share of each heir. ' Other Civil Code articles
indicate even more explicitly that collation is an incident to the parti-
tion of a succession. Article 1227 declares that the purpose of collation
is "in order that such property may be divided together with the other
effects of the succession;" article 1229 indicates that collation is
founded on the equality of descendant heirs "who divide among them
[selves]" the succession of their ascendants; and articles 1283 and
1255 respectively allow movables and immovables to be collated by
taking less. 7
Since it clearly appears that collation is an incident to the parti-
tion of a succession, the proper time for a forced heir to demand
collation must arise concurrently. It follows that a forced heir may
either institute a suit for partition coupled with a demand for colla-
Lamotte v. Martin, 52 La. Ann. 864, 27 So. 291 (1899); Succession of Couder, 46 La.
Ann. 265, 14 So. 907 (1894); Benoit v. Benoit's Heirs, 8 La. 228 (1835); Jackson v.
Jackson, 175 So. 2d 360 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965). See generally, Note, 25 LA. L. REV.
983, 986-87 (1965).
51. Succession of Webre, 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965); In re Andrus, 221 La.
996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952); Roach v. Roach, 213 La. 746, 35 So. 2d 597 (1948); Himel v.
Connelly, 195 La. 769, 197 So. 424 (1940); Naudon v. Mauvezin, 194 La. 739, 194 So.
766 (1940).
52. See Succession of Webre, 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1955)(dissenting opin-
ions).
53. Book 111, Title I, Chapter 12, Section 4-"How The Recorder of the Parish or
The Notary is Bound to Proceed in the Judicial Partition." LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1347-
81.
54. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1352.
55. Id. art. 1356.
56. Id. arts. 1359-64.
57. How can an heir take "less" unless he takes "something" by virtue of a
partition of the succession? See LA. Civ. CODE art. 1253.
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tion or may simply demand collation during partition proceedings
instituted by a co-heir)'1 In either case, a previous judgment of posses-
sion should have no effect so long as the succession was never pre-
viously partitioned. However, if no demand for collation is raised
prior to the homologation of the partition, all claims for collation
should thereafter be barred)"
Prescription of the Right to Demand Collation
Initial judicial attempts to establish a prescriptive period for the
right to demand collation culminated inconclusively in In re
Andrus."" There the supreme court expressly overruled an earlier
case"l which had held that the prescription of five years in Civil Code
article 3542 applied to collation. But since it was superfluous to the
facts presented in Andrus, the question of whether the prescription
of ten or thirty years might apply to collation was left unanswered.
The issue of a prescriptive period for the right to demand colla-
tion was ostensibly resolved in Succession of Webre.i2 In that case,
certain children and grandchildren of the de cujus sought to have
annulled as simulations separate conveyances of land which had been
made to other forced heirs. Alternatively, the petitioners prayed for
collation of the allegedly simulated conveyances."3 Since more than
ten years had elapsed since their father's death, the defendant heirs
raised pleas of prescription of five and ten years. The court of appeal 4
58. A limited exception to this rule may arise if the only asset of the succession is
a sum due by way of collation. Champagne v. Champagne, 125 La. 408, 51 So. 440
(1910); Grandchamps v. Delpeuch, 7 Rob. 429 (La. 1844); Benoit v. Benoit's Heir, 8
La. 228 (1835). In such cases, it seems both reasonable and equitable to allow an heir
to bring a direct action for collation. Note, 3 LA. L. REV. 460 (1941).
59. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1382; see also LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 4608-12. If the
partition is later rescinded, the right to demand collation should again become avail-
able. Note, 3 LA. L. REV. 460 (1941). See notes 77-80 and the accompanying text infra.
60. 221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952).
61. Naudon v. Mauvezin, 194 La. 739, 194 So. 766 (1940). In that case, the court
seemed to think that collation and the reduction of an excessive donation were synony-
mous. In overruling Naudon, the court in In re Andrus said that "[tlhe difference
between the right to demand collation and the right to demand reduction of an exces-
sive donation or legacy to the disposable portion is that collation can be demanded
only from a co-heir, but does not depend upon the extent of inequality in the disposi-
lion of the ancestor's estate; whereas the right to demand a reduction of an excessive
donation or legacy to the disposable portion may be demanded from any heir or lega-
tee-whether he be an heir or a stranger-but it can be demanded only when-and to
the extent that-the donation or legacy exceeds the disposable portion." In re Andrus,
221 La. 996, 1010-11, 60 So. 2d 899, 904 (1952); accord, Jordan v. Filmore, 167 La. 725,
7:31, 120 So. 275, 277 (1929).
62. 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965).
63. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1248.
64. Succession of Webre, 164 So. 2d 49 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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refused to annul the conveyances but instead found them to be dis-
guised donations, normally subject to collation. However, the court
concluded that collation is a "personal action" governed by Civil
Code article 3544, and it therefore upheld the exception of ten years
prescription. On certiorari, the supreme court determined that the
transfers to the defendants were simulated conveyances which should
have been annulled by the lower court. " Since a reversal and remand
thereby became necessary, the court need have said no more. Never-
theless, the majority proceeded to affirm the court of appeal's opinion
that collation is a personal action which prescribes ten years after the
death of an ancestor.
6
The ten-year prescription embodied in article 3544 can be ap-
plied to collation only if it can be classified as a "personal action."
Yet, the Civil Code speaks of collation as an obligation of forced
heirs,6 7 enforcement of which is a right of any co-heir;ii and the Code
of Civil Procedure defines a personal action as "one brought to en-
force an obligation against the obligor, personally and independently
of the property which he may own, claim, or possess."" It is therefore
disputable whether the right to demand collation can be categorized
as a personal action.7"' In any event, the right to demand collation
should not prescribe ten years after the death of the de cujus, princi-
pally because of the inseparable nexus between collation and the
action of partition.7 Since the right to compel the partition of a
succession held in common is imprescriptible,72 the right to demand
65. An action to annul a sale under Civil Code article 2239 is imprescriptible.
Schalaida v. Gonzales, 174 La. 907, 142 So. 123 (1932); Smelley v. Ricks, 174 La. 734,
141 So. 445 (1932); Houghton v. Houghton, 165 La. 1019, 116 So. 493 (1928); Guilbeau
v. Thibodaux, 30 La. Ann. 1099 (1878).
66. Dissenting from the majority opinion insofar as it affirmed the application of
a ten-year prescriptive period to collation were Justice McCaleb and Chief Justice
Fournet, who both considered that part of the opinion as merely advisory and prema-
ture since the suit did not involve a partition of the decedent's succession. Succession
of Webre, 221 La. 996, 60 So. 2d 899 (1952)(dissenting opinions). See note 58 and the
accompanying text supra.
67. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1229, 1235-36, 1238, 1240.
68. Id. art. 1235.
69. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 422 (Emphasis added.)
70. See generally, Note, 25 LA. L. REV. 983, 990-92 (1965). There the author
expressed doubt as to the validity of classifying collation as a personal action, espe-
cially where immovable property is involved.
71. See notes 48-59 and the accompanying text supra.
72. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1304. However, if one heir possesses the whole or part of a
succession separately and continuously for thirty years, the other heirs can be pre-
vented from partitioning that property. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1305. This has been classi-
fied as a special type of acquisitive prescription. See, e.g., Lee v. Jones, 224 La. 231,
69 So. 2d 26 (1953); Liles v. Pitts, 145 La. 650, 82 So. 735 (1919)(dissenting opinion);
Tyler v. Lewis, 143 La. 229, 78 So. 477 (1918).
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collation should not be independently subject to prescription. Other-
wise, the illogical consequence is that the right to demand a partition
may be partially extinguished by prescription, insofar as it relates to
collation, while simultaneously remaining in full force and effect in-
definitely, insofar as it relates to the distribution of the effects of the
succession. 7 Moreover, there are some circumstances under which
collation within ten years of an ancestor's death may be impractical
or impossible."1
Even if it be conceded that ten years prescription under article
3544 should apply to collation, the practical effect seems negligible.
The running of prescription should commence only when partition
proceedings are instituted since prior to that time there is no effective
opportunity to demand collation.715 The fact that the prescriptive pe-
riod for the action to reduce excessive donations begins upon the
death of the de cujus does not justify a similar rule for the right to
demand collation, since the reduction of an excessive donation, un-
like collation, is independent of the action of partition. 6 As noted
previously," demands for collation made after a partition should be
barred"' unless the partition is later rescinded.7" Since the action to
rescind a partition prescribes in five years, a ten-year prescriptive
period for collation would usually be irrelevant."
73. "Collation is an incident of the operation of partition. It cannot be separately
subjected to prescription without holding that the action of partition may be partially
extinguished in so far as it relates to collation, though in full force and effect in so far
as it relates to the distribution of the property. This would be contradictory, for of
properties to be contributed [to the mass to be dividedl are the donations to the heirs
that are subject to collation; therefore, during the time that the action for a partition
lies, the action 'en rapport' [of collationi is unextinguished." Sibley v. Pierson, 125
La. 478, 518, 51 So. 502, 515 (1910)(rehearing); accord, Succession of Couder, 46 La.
Ann. 265, 272, 14 So. 907, 909 (1894).
74. For example, the surviving spouse's usufruct under Civil Code article 916
cannot be impaired by the heirs who are naked owners. LA. CIv. CODE art. 600.
75. See note 58 and the accompanying text supra. Prescription begins to run only
when a cause of action arises. See, e.g., Dalton v. Plumbers Local, 240 La. 246, 122
So. 2d 88 (1960); Succession of Dancie, 191 La. 518, 186 So. 14 (1939); McGuire v.
Monroe Scrap Mat. Co., 189 La. 573, 180 So. 413 (1938); Succession of Oliver, 184 La.
26, 165 So. 318 (1936); Succession of Clark, 155 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
76. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1502-18. See also note 61 supra.
77. See note 59 and the accompanying text supra.
78. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 1382. A distinction between prescription and a bar by
operation of law is that the former is based solely on the passage of time whereas the
latter is dependent upon the doing of some act or the occurrence of some event other
than the passage of time. Comment, 27 TUL. L. REV. 232, 241 (1953).
79. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 1397-1414.
80. Id. art. 1413. An exception may arise if the partition is rescinded due to error
or fraud discovered more than five years after the homologation of the partition since
in that case more than ten years would have elapsed from the institution of the parti-
t ion proceedings.
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The adverse effects of the present jurisprudential rule of pre-
scription"' are readily apparent. Forced heirs who take no action re-
garding an ancestor's succession for ten years after his death may be
deprived of an opportunity to obtain their rightful inheritance. Ap-
parently the only argument in favor of the current rule is that it may
promote the alienability of gifts and legacies which forced heirs have
received from an ancestor.82 However, this is an illusory contention
since a forced heir who wishes to alienate such property need not wait
ten years before so doing. Both movables and immovables can be
collated by taking less;' :' thus, a forced heir can always alienate or
mortgage the property which he holds up to the value of his legitime.
Moreover, any heir who desires to clarify his rights need only demand
a partition of the succession. 4 Third party purchasers and mortga-
gees are already protected by other provisions of the law.15
Collation of Debts
The obligation to collate is not confined to only those advantages
received through simple donations inter vivos and mortis causa. Ex-
cept for certain enumerated exceptions,"8 the obligation extends to all
advantages received from the de cujus "though in any other manner
than by donation or legacy." 7 Consequently, a child must collate
unpaid debts which he had owed to his deceased parent."8 Similarly,
grandchildren who represent a predeceased parent in a grandparent's
succession are required by the Civil Code to collate their own advan-
tages as well as those of the parent whom they represent. " Neverthe-
81. See Succession of Webre, 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965); Cannon v.
Cannon, 244 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971); Milano v. Milano, 243 So. 2d 876 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1971); Pounds v. Yancy, 224 So. 2d 1 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
82. See Note, 25 LA. L. REv. 983, 988 (1965).
83. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1255, 1283.
84. Id. art. 1289.
85. Id. arts. 1264, 1265, 1280, 1282.
86. Id. arts. 1244-47, 1250.
87. Id. art. 1248.
88. See Rizan v. Rizan, 139 La. 364, 71 So. 581 (1916); King v. King, 107 La. 437,
31 So. 894 (1902); Succession of Skipwith, 15 La. Ann. 209 (1860); Succession of
McLellan, 159 So. 2d 351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Comment, 26 TUL. L. REv. 203,
219 (1952). See also Himel v. Connelly, 195 La. 769, 197 So. 424 (1940); Succession of
Bougere, 28 La. Ann. 743 (1976); Succession of Cucullu, 9 La. Ann. 96 (1854); cf.
Succession of Waterman, 183 La. 1006, 165 So. 182 (1936); Destrehan v. Destrehan's
Executors, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 557 (1826).
89. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1238, 1240. It should be noted that such grandchildren
are obligated to collate only gifts made or legacies left to them by their grandfather or
grandmother after the death of the parent whom they represent, for it is only at that
time that they appear in the quality of forced heirs.
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less, the jurisprudence"" since the 1826 case of Destrehan v. Destre-
han's Executors"' indicates that such grandchildren need not collate
the unpaid debts due by their parents to their grandparents.
Destrehan arose out of an adjustment and partition of the succes-
sion of Jean Destrehan who was survived by several children as well
as grandchildren who were the children of a predeceased son, Guy.
The grandchildren, who had previously accepted their father's suc-
cession with benefit of inventory,"2 claimed his share of their grand-
father's succession by right of representation."3 They were opposed by
uncles and aunts who insisted that the grandchildren should first be
required to collate a loan from their grandfather to their father evi-
denced by the latter's unpaid note for over $58,000. Primarily because
a substantial portion of the note represented interest,"4 the supreme
court in its original opinion found the loan to have been an onerous
contract rather than a donation. As a result, the court concluded that
the de cujus had not intended to bestow an advantage upon his son,
and on the authority of a provision in the Digest of 1808 which stated
that "burthensome obligations" did not have to be collated," held
that the grandchildren were not required to collate their father's un-
paid debt. On rehearing, the court acknowledged that in originally
classifying the loan as a "burthensome obligation" not subject to
collation, it had overlooked another provision of the Digest of 1808
which required an heir to collate "debts by him due.""' But even
though the court admitted that Guy would have been obligated to
collate the $58,000 debt had he survived his father, it held that his
children were not so obligated, on the ground that grandchildren
representing a parent in their grandparent's succession have greater
90. Succession of Meyer, 44 La. Ann. 871, 11 So. 532 (1892); Calhoun v. Cross-
grove, 33 La. Ann. 1001 (1881); Succession of Morgan, 23 La. Ann. 290 (1871); Destre-
han v. Destrehan's Executors, 4 Mart. (N.D.) 557 (1826); see Succession of Schneidau,
182 La. 613, 162 So. 197 (1935); McKensie v. Bacon, 40 La. Ann. 157, 4 So. 65 (1888).
91. 4 Mart.(N.S.) 557 (1826).
92. When an heir accepts under the benefit of inventory, he does not personally
obligate himself to pay the debts of the de cujus. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1058.
93. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 894, 895, 898. See also notes 98-100 and the accompa-
nying text infra.
94. The proportion of the note which represented interest was unsettled; however,
it was agreed that the interest rate was the maximum allowed by law.
95. La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, tit. I, art. 206, par. 2. This provision was deleted
from the Civil Code of 1825.
96. Id. art. 178. This provision was superceded by article 1356(4) of the Civil Code
which states that the active mass of the succession to be partitioned shall include the
"sums" which the heirs may owe the succession. LA. Civ. CODE art.1356 (comp. ed. 16
West LSA-Civ. Code 1972). See note 105 infra.
[Vol. 34
COMMENTS
rights than the parent whom they represent and are therefore not
required to collate the parent's unpaid debts."7
Civil Code article 894 defines representation as "a fiction"9 of the
law, the effect of which is to put the representative in the place,
degree, and rights of the person represented." 9 The fundamental
principle upon which the theory of representation is founded is that
it prevents grandchildren from being excluded from their grandpar-
ent's succession merely by the premature death of their parent."'
However, to insure that other forced heirs of a nearer degree are not
unjustly prejudiced by representation, the Civil Code provides that
the representatives shall take only the virile share of the parent whom
they represent.""
There is no legislative justification for the heretofore unchal-
lenged holding in Destrehan that children who represent a prede-
ceased parent are possessed of greater rights than their parent. Nei-
ther article 900 nor 901, both cited in Destrehan in support of the
court's holding requires the result reached by the court. Article 900
provides that a child may renounce the succession of his parent and
still represent him. Although this article allows a child to escape the
obligation of paying the debts of the parent represented, it does not
allow him to avoid the obligation of collating them. Likewise, article
9011''1 states that a child may represent a parent who has been disin-
97. The court concluded that the loan was not a "gift" and therefore it determined
that the children were not required to collate it since article 1240 of the Civil Code
requires children who represent a parent to collate only what "had been given" to their
parent. But see note 104 and the accompanying text infra.
98. Use of the word "fiction" has been criticized. See generally, 9 AUBREY ET RAU,
DROIT CiVil, FRANCAIS § 597, at 391 (6th ed. 1953); 9 MARCADE, EXPLICATION DU CODE
NAPOLEON n" 112, at 73-74 (5th ed. 1852); 3 PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
n" 1761 (11th ed. 1938).
99. (Emphasis added.)
100. 9 AURRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 597, at 391 (6th ed. 1953). For exam-
ple, if the predeceased son of a de cujus has surviving brothers and sisters, his own
children could not participate in the succession in their own right because they would
he excluded by the still living descendants in the first degree, their uncles and aunts.
Representation prevents this inequity by permitting the children of the predeceased
son to participate in their grandparent's succession in place of their father.
101. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 898.
102. Since a child can never represent a parent while the parent is alive due to
Civil Code article 899, part of article 901 is superfluous at best. "The unworthy heir
who is living at the opening of the succession is excluded by his unworthiness. His
children cannot represent him, not because he is unworthy, but because no one can
represent a living person." 9 LAURENT, PRINCIPLES DE DROIT CIVIL n" 72, at 84 (2d ed.
1876). The confusion may result from the fact that article 901 is an aberration, not
contained in the Code Napoleon, which represents the minority French interpretation
of Code Napoleon article 730. LAZARUS, CASES AND READING MATERIALS ON SUCCESSIONS
AND DONATIONS 19 (Rev. ed. 1970); see 3 MARCADE, EXPLICATION DU CODE CIVIL n" 84-
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herited or declared unworthy; but it does not dispense with the repre-
sentative's obligation to collate the advantages received by the person
represented.""
Civil Code article 1240 literally requires grandchildren who come
to a grandparent's succession by representation to collate only that
which "had been given" to the parent represented. To restrict this
article to simple donations is not only unwarranted, but it is alien to
the overall scheme of the law of collation"" as well as directly contra-
dictory to the positive statement in article 1248 that all advantages
bestowed by a parent upon his child are subject to the requirement
of collation. Accordingly, article 1240 should be construed as supple-
mentary legislation designed to insure that the broad concept out-
lined in article 1248 will be applied whenever a grandchild inherits
by representation, so that all advantages received by the parent rep-
resented-including unpaid debts-will be collated.
The collation of debts is merely a corollary of the principle of
equality which demands the collation of all advantages which were
not intended as an extra portion." 5 A debt which has been gratui-
89, at 55-60 (5th ed. 1852); 13 DEMOLOMBE, COURS DU CODE NAPOLEON n' 292, at 351-54
(1879). As such, article 901 cannot easily be reconciled with Louisiana Civil Code
article 973 which appears to indicate that the children of the person declared unworthy
must succeed in their own right rather than by representation. This is the view of most
French commentators with regard to Code Napoleon article 730. LAZARUS, CASES AND
READING MATERIALS ON SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS 19 (Rev. ed. 1970); see 9 AUBRY ET
RAU, DROIT CIVIl. FRANCAIS § 597, at 395 (6th ed. 1953); 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET
WAHL, DES SUCCESSIONS n" 289, at 228 (2d ed. 1899); 9 LAURENT, PRINCIPLES DE DROIT
Civi, n" 72, at 84 (2d ed. 1876); 3 RIPERT ET BOULANGER, TRAITE' EIEMENTAIRE DE DROIT
Civil. D PLANIL n" 1552, at 505-06 (1951); 2 ZACHARIAE, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 356,
at 247 (1855).
103. The majority of the French commentators, including those from whom Louis-
iana Civil Code article 901 was derived, agree that the representative can take no
greater rights than those of the person represented. See 9 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL
FERANCAIS § 597, at. 396 (6th ed. 1953); 13 DEMOLOMBE, COURS DU CODE NAPOL0ON n" 433
(1879); 10 LAURENT, PRINCIPLES DE DROIT CIvIL FRANCAIS n" 563, at 616-17 (2d ed. 1876);
9 MARCADO., ExPLICATION DU CODE NAPOILOON n" 112, at 73-74 (5th ed. 1852); 3 PLANIOL,
TRAITO, EI.,MENTAIRE DR DROIT CIVIl. n" 2224, at 83 (1 1th ed. 1938); 2 TOULLIER-DUVERGIER,
LE DROIT Civi, FRANCAIS n" 459, at 286 (6th ed. 1839).
104. That is, the supposed or real return to the mass of the succession of all
property which the forced heir received from the de cujus in advance of his share or
otherwise. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1227 (1870).
105. 3 PiANioL, TRAITIO ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL n" 2301, at 113 (11th ed. 1938).
See Civil Code article 1356(4) which provides that the active mass of the succession
to he partitioned shall be composed of "all the sums which the heirs may owe to the
succession." Although not expressly so indicated, this provision, when read in context,
appears to require debts to be collated. The predecessor of article 1356(4) left no doubt
about this requirement since each co-parcener was expressly required to collate "debts
by him due" to the de cujus. La. Digest of 1808, bk. III, tit. I, art. 178.
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tously remitted by the de cujus is plainly nothing more than a dona-
tion.' Even though a debt was not expressly remitted, there may be
strong evidence that the de cujus never intended to demand its pay-
ment, such as where the loan was for a protracted term or required
no security. In such cases, the requirement that a debt be collated
raises no difficulties. However, in limited cases where an unmatured
debt represents an arms-length transaction between a parent-creditor
and a child-debtor it is unclear whether the debt should be collated
immediately or merely paid when the obligation matures."7 In any
event, the presumption of equality among co-heirs which underlies
the collation of gifts and legacies is compromised if an insolvent heir
is allowed to receive his hereditary share without having to account
for a debt to his parent which remains partially or totally unpaid."'
A similar subversion of the principle of collation results if a grand-
child who has renounced his parent's succession is allowed by repre-
sentation to recover his parent's entire hereditary portion from the
succession of his grandparent while simultaneously escaping the obli-
gation of paying or collating his parent's unpaid debts.
Lastly, it should be noted that the extinguishment of a debt owed
the de cujus does not relieve the forced-heir debtor or his representa-
tive from collation.' Hence, there is no merit to a contention that
renunciation or acceptance of a parent's succession with benefit of
inventory obviates the necessity to collate any unpaid debts which
106. See Comment, 26 TUL. L. REV.] 203, 220 (1952).
107. See generally, 3 PLANIOL, TRAITO ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL n* 2303, at 115
(1 lth ed. 1938). A conflict may arise if the unmatured debt to be collated exceeds the
share of the heir obligated to collate, for then the heir would be obligated to return
the debt when the succession is partitioned, possibly resulting in an impairment of the
contract under which the debt is not yet due. But if the debt to be collated is less than
the share of' the heir obligated to collate, it can be collated by taking less, and the
contract between the parties is thereby only indirectly affected. See LA. Civ. CODE art.
1285. In the only Louisiana case shedding any light on this problem, the court required
remitted interest to be collated at the time of the partition and allowed the credit right
to the uniatured principal to be divided among the forced heirs. LeBlanc v. Bertant,
16 La. Ann. 294 (1861).
108. See 9 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 634(a) (6th ed. 1954) in C.
LAZARuS, 4 Civn. LAW TRANSLATIONS 408 (1971).
109. Thus, neither remission of the debt by the de cujus, bankruptcy, nor pre-
scription relieves the forced-heir debtor of the obligation to collate. See Rizan v. Rizan,
1:39 La. 364, 71 So. 581 (1916); King v. King, 107 La. 437, 31 So. 894 (1902); LeBlanc
v. Bertant, 16 La. Ann. 294 (1861); Comment, 26 TUL. L. REV. 203, 220 (1952) (remis-
sion of debt); Himel v. Connelly, 195 La. 769, 197 So. 424 (1940); Succession of Boug-
ere, 28 La. Ann. 743 (1876); Succession of Cucullu, 9 La. Ann. 96 (1854); contra 3
PLANjOI., TRAITE EEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL n" 2305, at 115 (11th ed. 1938)(bank-
ruptcy); Succession of Skipwith, 15 La. Ann. 209 (1860); Succession of McClellan, 159
So. 2d 351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964) (prescription).
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the represented parent owed the de cujus. Although the obligation to
pay such debts may be extinguished by the renunciation or accept-
ance with benefit of inventory, the obligation to collate them still
subsists.'"
Leslie J. Clement, Jr.
110. See generally, 10 LAURENT, PRINCIPLES DE DRorr CIVIL FRANCAIS n" 563, 616-
17 (2d ed. 1876).
